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Abstract
We present new evidence on the macroeconomic effects of changes in microprudential bank
capital requirements, using confidential regulatory data from the Basel I and II regimes in
the United Kingdom. Our central result is that an increase in capital requirements lowered
lending to firms and households, reduced aggregate expenditure and raised credit spreads.
A financial accelerator effect is found to have amplified the macroeconomic responses to
shifts in bank credit supply. Results from a counterfactual experiment that links capital
requirements to house prices and mortgage spreads indicate that tighter macroprudential
policy would have had a moderating effect on house price and mortgage lending growth
in the early 2000s, with easier monetary policy acting to offset its contractionary effects on
output.
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1 Introduction
Equity capital has special importance for banks. Compared to non-financial firms, banks fund
a relatively small proportion of their assets using it.1 Prudential regulators have a long history
of setting down minimum standards for it.2 And during the financial turmoil in advanced
economies that began in 2007, the UK government alone put £37 billion of it into the banking
system (HM Treasury, 2009). In this paper we quantify the impact of regulation-induced changes
in bank capital on the macroeconomy, study the interaction between regulatory and monetary
policies, and assess post-crisis reforms to the Basel Accords that grant regulators macropru-
dential powers over minimum capital standards (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
2010a).
The central empirical questions we address—whether aggregate variables respond to changes
in bank capital, and if so, whether active adjustments in capital requirements might be a useful
policy tool—are far from settled.3 The reason is that answers to these questions have not been
straightforward to obtain. The first difficulty is that most variation in bank capital is likely to be
the result of disturbances to macroeconomic variables, such as output or interest rates. These
variables affect capital directly by causing variation in retained earnings and in the prices of
assets held in bank trading books (the ‘bank capital channel’, Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004).
The same disturbances also affect credit demand, creating an identification problem. While
specific one-off events have provided some convincing evidence of a channel from changes in
bank capital to pockets of economic activity, via lending, progress has otherwise been limited
by a lack of suitable instruments.4
The second difficulty lies in isolating changes in bank capital caused by regulation. In
1In the UK, for example, quoted and unquoted equity together make up a little over half of the financial liabilities
of non-financial firms (ONS Blue Book, various issues). Banking system equity makes up between 4-6% of their
liabilities, as measured by their regulatory simple leverage ratio (Bank of England Financial Stability Report, various
issues).
2Capital requirements date back to the mid-19th Century. Countries have historically set a wide variety of
restrictions including fixed minimum levels of capital, minimums that depended on the population in a bank’s
operational locale, and from the early 20th Century minimum proportions of liabilities (Grossman, 2010, Ch. 6).
Since the introduction of the Basel Accords in 1988, capital requirements on banks in jurisdictions that adopted the
international rules have been formulated in terms of the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets.
3Theoretical arguments rest on there being an economically large deviation from the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance
proposition, leading higher capital requirements to raise bank funding costs (Miller, 1995). If such costs are passed
through to borrowers, a reduction in credit, and by extension aggregate expenditure, may result. Comparative
analysis of models incorporating financing frictions on banks does offer theoretical support to the proposition
that changes bank capital can have significant macroeconomic effects (Guerrieri, Iacoviello, Covas, Driscoll, Kiley,
Jahan-Pavar, Queralto Olive, and Sim, 2015).
4See for example Peek and Rosengren (2000) (commercial real estate construction activity), and Ashcraft (2005)
(county-level real activity in Texas). These event-type studies provide a high level of econometric credibility, but by
their nature have a scope that is limited in time and place. An influential earlier literature examined the introduction
of leverage restrictions and risk-based capital requirements in the U.S. as part of the first Basel Accords; see Berger
and Udell (1994), Hancock and Wilcox (1997, 1998).
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most jurisdictions, such changes have been infrequent, leading researchers to rely instead on
qualitative measures of regulatory stringency (Peek, Rosengren, and Tootell, 2003; Bassett, Lee,
and Spiller, 2013). Where systematic reviews of individual banks’ capital requirements did take
place, the effects of regulation on bank-level loan supply can be estimated. But for a model to
be useable in formulating stabilization policies, it must provide estimates of the ‘total’ effect
of a shift in bank capital on loan supply, taking into account feedbacks between the banking
system and the macroeconomy. This is not possible with a purely bank-level analysis of capital
requirements and lending (Francis and Osborne, 2009a; Aiyar, Calomiris, and Wieladek, 2016).
In this paper we claim to go some way towards resolving these problems. Over the 1990-
2008 period covered in this study, regulators required individual banks operating in the UK
to hold capital in excess of the time-invariant minimum levels set down in the Basel Accords.
Regulators operated a system in which there was variation in capital requirements both over
time and across banks.5 We combine this confidential regulatory data with aggregate bank
lending and bank capital series, and with a set of macroeconomic variables, then estimate a
standard macroeconomic vector autoregression (VAR) under a set of restrictions that identify a
microprudential policy shock.
The restrictions we formulate to identify regulation-induced shocks to banking system cap-
ital exploit features of the institutional framework in which microprudential supervisors op-
erated, as well as more-conventional assumptions on timing. First, for policy and operational
reasons, supervisors did not respond to contemporaneous developments in the macroeconomy,
and so we impose that condition on the model. We instead allow policy to respond to its second
round influence on banking variables, which appear with a delay. Next, capital requirements
were confidential to the supervisor-firm relationship, precluding a direct macroeconomic re-
sponse. We impose the restriction that capital variables have no direct effect on macroeconomic
variables, but rather influence aggregate outcomes via a bank lending channel. Last, we as-
sume that there is a delay between the announcement of a regulatory change, and the resulting
change in bank lending policy.
Our central finding is that changes in microprudential capital requirements on banks have
statistically and economically important spill-overs to the macroeconomy. A tightening of
capital requirements reduces credit growth to households and non-financial firms, and raises
spreads on home mortgages and on corporate bonds. Housing market activity is damped
down by the regulatory action, which results in both lower average house prices and a higher
5Francis and Osborne (2009b) provide a description of the institutional environment, and summarise trends in
UK banking capitalisation. The Bank of England was responsible for banking regulation prior to 1997, with the
Financial Services Authority (FSA) in charge thereafter. The Prudential Regulatory Authority, a subsidiary of the
Bank, took over from the FSA in April, 2013. However, the earlier date of December 2008 marks a distinct change
in FSA policy to an ‘Enhanced Prudential Regime’, and so we end our analysis in 2008:Q3 (see Bailey, 2012).
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proportion of mortgages in arrears. We also report important interactions between prudential
and monetary policies. Systematic monetary policy easing acts to cushion the effect of changes
in prudential policy on output, which for a 50 basis point increase in the average required
capital ratio is a little over 0.2% lower than trend, two-to-three years after the shock. In the
absence of a monetary policy response, peak output declines are larger, at roughly 0.3%. These
findings indicate that the microeconomic frictions that lead bank equity finance to be costly are
of macroeconomic relevance. And they complement a growing literature that identifies credit
markets as a source of aggregate fluctuations, as in Gilchrist and Zakrajsˇek (2012), Meeks (2012),
and Walentin (2014).
To help inform the conduct of policy with time-varying capital requirements as a macropru-
dential tool (the so-called counter cyclical buffer found in Basel III), we go on to report the results
of a counterfactual simulation exercise. The exercise is motivated by the shortage of direct ex-
perience with the tool, and complements the literature that uses DSGE or macroeconometric
models to analyse macroprudential policy (Angelini, Neri, and Panetta, 2014; Akram, 2014).
We find that a macroprudential rule linking capital requirements to house prices and mortgage
spreads would have led to a substantially higher aggregate capital ratio, and would have had
a modest moderating influence on credit growth and house prices, prior to the financial crisis
of 2008.
The VAR model that we specify resembles those adopted by Berrospide and Edge (2010),
Iacoviello and Minetti (2008), and Walentin (2014) in that macroeconomic and banking factors
both appear, but it includes a somewhat richer set of variables to account simultaneously for
bank balance sheet dynamics, and credit, housing market, and other macroeconomic conditions.
We share with Bassett, Chosak, Driscoll, and Zakrajsˇek (2014) and Me´sonnier and Stevanovic
(2015) the goal of isolating the effect of shifts in the supply of bank lending on the economy
at large. But the present paper is unique in isolating the effect of microprudential regulatory
action on aggregate conditions.
The econometric estimates we present exploit bank-level variation in required capital ratios
to sharpen our estimates of the relationship between changes in regulation and changes in
bank lending. Formally, estimates from bank-level panel data inform the prior parameter
distribution of a standard Bayesian VAR for macroeconomic aggregates. The idea of combining
micro and macro information via a Bayesian prior was previously employed in the context
of a DSGE model by Chang, Gomes, and Schorfheide (2002). Our combined micro-macro
estimation approach includes as a special case the ‘plug in’ method adopted by De Graeve,
Kick, and Koetter (2008), but rather than treating micro estimates as fixed parameters, allows
the additional information present in aggregate data to affect aggregate dynamics, and an
appropriate assessment of parameter uncertainty. The part of our analysis that deals with
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bank-level data is similar to that in Francis and Osborne (2009a), Labonne and Lame´ (2014), and
Aiyar, Calomiris, and Wieladek (2014, 2016). But whereas those studies confined their interest
to an analysis of the bank-level effect of regulatory action, our study instead uses them as a
springboard for an analysis of the broader macroeconomic effect of regulation.
An alternative approach to incorporating micro information into the estimation of an ag-
gregate VAR is to augment the model with statistical factors, extracted from institution-level
balance sheet data. In such a factor-augmented VAR (FAVAR), the dynamic properties of
the common components of important banking variables are modeled alongside an array of
macroeconomic data, see Jimborean and Me´sonnier (2010) and Buch, Eickmeier, and Prieto
(2010). Something of a drawback of the FAVAR approach is that first stage extraction of princi-
pal components does not deal well with the type of rotating panel data typically encountered
in practice.6
Our approach to identification is standard in the VAR literature, and rests on institutional
facts particular to the UK regulatory environment. An alternative idea is to identify shocks
at the micro level, and then to aggregate them in order to assess their macroeconomic effects.
Examples may be found in Amiti and Weinstein (2013), who use matched bank-firm loan data,
and Bassett, Chosak, Driscoll, and Zakrajsˇek (2014), who use bank-level survey responses on
loan demand. However, the micro-identification approach requires adequate controls for bank-
and firm-level credit demand to be found, and these are lacking in the UK case.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives details of the data that is
used in the empirical work. Section 3 discusses the institutional arrangements under which
microprudential policy was set. Section 4 summarises bank-level evidence on the relationship
between capital regulation and lending and sets out the macroeconomic model used in the
main analysis. The principal results on the macroeconomic impact of capital regulation can be
found in section 5, while section 6 reports on the results of a counterfactual experiment in which
capital requirements are set according to a macroprudential rule. Section 7 presents robustness
checks on the estimation method and identification, and section 8 concludes.
2 Data
Two categories of information are used in the analysis: aggregate macroeconomic data, and
micro banking data.7 The banking data is a group-consolidated level panel covering some 19
years. The panel is unbalanced and rotating, principally due to multiple merger and takeover
6This limitation has lead Jimborean and Me´sonnier and others to filter out banks which enter or exit over their
sample period, including due to mergers, which raises concerns of sample selection bias.
7Details of the data and its sources can be found in Appendix A.
5
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
events.8 After filtering to remove banks who advanced little or no direct loans to firms or
households, the dataset contains 644 observations on 21 UK banking groups, treating pre- and
post-merger banks as separate entities (see Table A.2). The sample is dominated by larger
banks, whose influence over aggregate lending is correspondingly of greatest importance.
Of central interest in this study is the confidential information on how much capital super-
visors required banks to fund themselves with, over and above the Basel minimum. Breaches
of this additional requirement, referred to as ‘individual capital guidance’ (ICG), would trigger
regulatory action, so the ratio of regulatory capital (including the ICG) to risk weighted assets is
referred to as the ‘trigger ratio’.9 In addition to the required capital ratio, we have information
on banks’ published capital ratio, constructed as the ratio of tier 1 or ‘core’ capital to risk-
weighted assets. We also make use of two measures of bank lending: to private non-financial
corporates (PNFCs), and secured mortgage lending to households. Both credit variables are
measured in terms of the flow of new lending in the current quarter (which differs from the
change in the stock of lending due to write-offs and other items) scaled by the stock of loans
outstanding in the previous quarter.10
The macroeconomic data includes a set of standard core variables (in levels): log real
gross domestic product, the log consumer price index and the Bank of England base rate. In
common with Walentin (2014) and Iacoviello and Minetti (2008), who also build models on
UK data, we include average house prices and mortgage spreads. In addition, we include the
proportion of households 6 months or more in arrears.11 As a rough proxy for the marginal
cost of external finance for corporations, we use the spread between average investment grade
corporate bond yields and 10 year gilts. We construct aggregate counterparts of the bank-
level capital and trigger ratios by taking the weighted average across banks each period; with
weights determined by banks’ lending share.12 The aggregated data, plotted in Figure 1,
8Davies, Richardson, Katinaite, and Manning (2010) detail some history of UK banking sector consolidation.
Most consolidation involving smaller firms occurred in the early 1990s. For example, Midland Bank was purchased
by HSBC in 1992; Lloyds absorbed the TSB and Cheltenham & Gloucester Building Society in 1995. The Lerner
index for the UK banking industry rose from a little above 0.1 in the early-1990s to 0.25 in the mid-1990s. It was
only a little higher than that at the end of our sample in 2008.
9Throughout, the Basel minimum requirement was a risk-asset ratio of 8%, of which at least 4% had to be tier 1
capital. The ICG framework was initially implemented under the Basel I regime, but was extended under Pillar 2
of Basel II (introduced in 2004).
10Aggregate counterparts of the lending series are obtained from Bankstats, and are based on a moderately larger
sample of lenders than those in the micro data. From the late 1990s onwards, the Bank of England has collected
securitization adjusted data on lending stocks, and we use these throughout. Securitization made a negligible
contribution to UK lending prior to that time. We refer the reader to Bridges, Gregory, Nielsen, Pezzini, Radia, and
Spaltro (2014) for additional description of the micro dataset, and details of its underlying sources.
11The principal reason for including arrears is to explain the data in the early 1990s, when a significant housing bust
and high interest rates led a large number of UK households to fall behind on repayments, and to nearly 350,000
homes being repossessed. These factors continued to depress mortgage lending long after a general economic
recovery was underway.
12The results below are near identical when using the unweighted series, so we report only on the weighted series.
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naturally inherit the relatively short history of the underlying micro data. The central point
of note is that micro variation in trigger ratios is not averaged away by aggregation, as Aiyar,
Calomiris, and Wieladek (2014) also remark. Moves in the trigger ratio are relatively infrequent
over the first part of the sample, but tend to be large; ignoring zero and very small changes, the
average quarterly change in the system-wide capital requirement was 15 basis points over the
full sample.
3 Institutional background and identification
Under the UK microprudential regime in force over the roughly two decades following the
introduction of the first Basel Accords, bank supervisors did not have the authority to change
minimum capital standards across the board. Instead, changes to the level of system-wide
capital requirements were a by-product of changes to the requirements placed on individual
banking groups. The institutional practices in place in the UK indicate that such changes were
not made in response to current macroeconomic news. Under Basel rules, the business cycle
was just one amongst a panoply of risks not captured by minimum (Pillar 1) standards for su-
pervisors to consider. Little concrete guidance was given on where and how to account for it.13
But of greater significance was the manner in which supervision was actually practiced. Super-
visors aimed to avoid abrupt changes in regulation, except in extreme circumstances, through
frequent contact with regulated banks.14 Macroeconomic conditions played into supervisors’
thinking about bank health, but macroeconomic news was not in itself a reason for immediate
regulatory action. Indeed, the micro data reveals only a handful of quarters where all the
changes in requirements—which affected roughly one in six banks each quarter—went in the
same direction, as might be expected if supervisors did respond to a common macroeconomic
factor.15
13The risks to be covered by supervisory review under Basel II Pillar 2 included: concentrations of credit risk;
interest rate risk in the banking book; and operational, reputational and strategic risk. The Basel documents speak of
being ‘mindful’ of the state of the business cycle, but also that Pillar 1 requirements already account for ‘uncertainties
... that affect the banking population as a whole’ (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006, paras. 726 and
757). See also the discussion in Aiyar, Calomiris, and Wieladek (2016).
14Under the pre-1997 Bank of England regime, this fact is evident from the infrequent adjustment of capital
requirements observed in Figure 2. If, as seems possible, banks were able to anticipate regulatory action, as a result
of their ongoing dialogue with bank supervisors, the estimated effects of actual changes in capital requirements
would naturally be attenuated. On the other hand, none of the bank-level variables included in the regressions
summarized in Table 1, in particular lending growth, were significant predictors for the trigger ratio. Under the
post-1997 FSA regime, formal supervisory reviews were conducted at set two-year intervals, all but ruling out
direct reactions to macroeconomic news. I am grateful to Brian Quinn and Michael Straughan for their guidance on
operational practices.
15Nevertheless, Aiyar, Calomiris, and Wieladek (2014) have argued that the result, if not the intention, of super-
visory actions was to produce counter-cyclical movements in aggregate capital requirements. They contend that
regulators operated a de facto macro-prudential regime (between 1998 and 2007), pointing to evidence that ‘average
capital requirements across the banking system were ... strikingly counter-cyclical’ (p. 10). They report a correlation
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Figure 1. Required and actual banking system capital ratios. Note: black line −−
weighted by share of lending; gray line −− unweighted (simple average). See
Appendix A for additional detail.
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A second important institutional consideration is that bank trigger ratios were not public
information, but were rather communicated privately between the supervisor and the individ-
ual regulated institution. Changes in the trigger ratio were therefore not directly observed by
the public, although an individual bank’s response to such a change naturally could be. In our
empirical work we therefore exclude direct channels from changes in capital requirements to
the macroeconomy, while allowing indirect channels through bank lending to operate, with a
one quarter lag. Perhaps the most substantive aspect of this exclusion restriction is the assump-
tion that monetary policy did not respond directly to changes in microprudential regulation,
particularly before 1997, when the Bank of England had responsibilities for both monetary
and microprudential policies.16 Although a strict separation existed between these functions,
effectively preventing the routine flow of regulatory information to other areas of the Bank, we
nevertheless examined the official record of Monetary Policy Committee meetings as a check.
There is no mention of capital requirements or of banking system capital until September 2007;
references remain infrequent thereafter, and do not appear to have had a direct bearing on
the monetary policy decision.17 This is understandable given that the only instance of modest
banking instability that the UK experienced in this period was amongst small- and medium-size
banks during 1991-1994 (see Logan, 2001), and given the removal of direct supervisory powers
from the central bank after independence in 1997. Although not conclusive, the official record
does not provide evidence that contradicts our assumption.
4 The empirical model
The tool we adopt to investigate the macroeconomic impact of prudential policy is a structural
VAR. The advantage of the VAR approach is that it captures complex dynamic interactions
between banking and macro variables, while imposing few restrictions. The mid-size VAR
that we work with, containing 11 variables, two lags and an intercept requires us to estimate
between the average trigger ratio and annual GDP growth of between 0.44 and 0.64, depending on the weighting
scheme used in aggregation. On our 1989-2008 sample and weighting trigger ratios by UK lending share, the
correlation is 0.40. Of course, unconditional correlations do not say anything about marginal effects after controlling
for bank-specific factors; but in the panel regression (C.1) for the trigger ratio, current GDP growth is insignificant,
with a t-ratio of 0.13.
16The power to set monetary policy rested with the Chancellor of the Exchequer until the Bank was granted
operational independence in 1997.
17Official minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee meetings are available from June 1997; prior to that, minutes
of the monthly meetings between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Governor of the Bank of England are
available from April 1994. The sole mention of prudential regulation during the sample period we consider is
contained in the minute of the January, 2008 meeting (para. 4): ‘[B]anks were becoming more cautious about
expanding their balance sheets ... [and] the introduction of the new Basel II regulatory regime for all banks at the
beginning of 2008 ... might have a knock-on effect on their willingness to lend’.
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a large number of parameters.18 Dense parameterization can in practice lead inference to be
unstable. Under the Bayesian approach to estimation, a prior distribution for the parameters
that contains substantive information along some, but not necessarily all, dimensions is used
to help overcome this difficulty.
4.1 Estimation and inference
Letting yt be a vector containing the m = 11 aggregate variables listed in section 2 and
summarized in Table A.1, and xt = (y
ᵀ
t−1, . . . ,y
ᵀ
t−p, 1)
ᵀ be a vector of lag terms, the structural
VAR(p) is given by:
yᵀt A = x
ᵀ
t F + ν
ᵀ
t , νt ∼ N(0, I) (1)
where A summarises the contemporaneous relationships between the elements of yt, νt is a
vector of independent stochastic disturbances, and F = (Fᵀ1 , . . .F
ᵀ
p , c)
ᵀ collects together both the
intercept vector c and the lagged autoregressive matrices. Individual structural equations are
read down columns of [Aᵀ;Fᵀ]ᵀ, with variables in rows.
Following Sims and Zha (1998), we take structural equations to be a priori independent.
Then denoting columns of the A and F matrices by lower case letters, for each equation i the
prior parameter distributions can be written:
ai ∼ N(0,S i) and fi|ai ∼ N(Bai,H i), i = 1, . . . ,m (2)
where S i and H i are prior covariance matrices, and B summarizes beliefs about reduced-
form dependencies between variables (see Appendix B). To set B in the prior conditional
distribution in (2) we make selective use of information from a subset of the variables in
the sample data Y = [y1, . . . ,yT]
ᵀ observed before 1990, and from the micro data described in
section 2, which we collect intoX0. We maintain the assumption thatY andX0 are independent,
conditional on the parameters θ B (ai, fi)mi=1.
19 The posterior density function is then given by
p(θ|Y) ∝ p(Y|θ)p(θ|X0), with posterior inference based on the output of the Waggoner and Zha
(2003) Gibbs sampler. An appealing aspect of the posterior parameter estimates is that they are
a function of both micro and macro information. The conditional independence assumption
considerably simplifies the analysis, at the cost of making what may be a somewhat crude
approximation. The robustness checks reported in section 7 therefore report on how varying
the weight placed on prior information affects the main results.
18More or fewer lags were not strongly favoured by the model’s marginal likelihood, but in practice longer lags
caused the bank-level estimates to become unreliable.
19Applied Bayesian analyses frequently draw on non-sample data to formulate priors, making the same implicit
conditional independence assumption. Our application follows the same rationale as that of Chang, Gomes, and
Schorfheide (2002, p. 1502), wherein (B.1) and (C.1) are the equivalents to their micro and macro models.
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4.2 Capital requirements and lending at the bank level
The relationship between minimum bank capital requirements, bank capital, and lending
to households and firms underpins the effect of prudential policy on aggregate activity. At the
individual bank level, several hundred changes to trigger ratios are recorded in our sample
(see Bridges, Gregory, Nielsen, Pezzini, Radia, and Spaltro, 2014, Table B). These provide
ample variation to estimate the relationships between capital and lending, which we use to set
elements of B. Moreover, with the individual data we are able to control for both observed
and unobserved heterogeneity, the absence of which might otherwise cause omitted variable
bias. As our sample is focused on larger banks, we do not allow for size-related dynamic
heterogeneity.
Table 1 presents reduced-form fixed effects regression results for each bank-level variable.20
The first two columns report on bank lending equations. Mortgage lending growth is moder-
ately persistent, likely due to banks’ reluctance to make sudden changes in consumer lending
policy, whereas corporate lending growth shows lower persistence. The signs on capital vari-
ables in the lending equations are as expected, with a higher trigger ratio acting to slow growth
both in secured and corporate credit, and a higher capital ratio acting to increase them. The
trigger ratio is statistically significant in the corporate lending equation, but not in the secured
lending equation. However, the results indicate that there are indirect channels linking the
capital requirements to mortgage lending through interactions between components of banks’
loan portfolios: in particular, when a bank makes a higher volume of corporate loans, there is
a statistically significant reduction in mortgage lending.
The second two columns report on bank capital equations. Both actual and required capital
ratios are estimated to be highly persistent, consistent with infrequent adjustment of the latter.
The estimates show that a higher trigger ratio tends to substantially raise banks’ capital ratios,
consistent with banks acting to restore the buffer of capital held above the regulatory minimum
(the long-run multiplier is statistically indistinguishable from unity, indicating one-for-one pass
through from requirements to actual capital ratios; see also Francis and Osborne, 2009a). None
of the observable controls appear to explain variation in the trigger ratio itself; the exception is
lags of the actual capital ratio, which enter with a small long-run multiplier.
4.3 Other prior information
The other information we use to set the prior is intended to counteract potential bias arising
from the short history at our disposal. The 18 year period covered by our bank-level data
20The results presented here are closely related to those reported in Francis and Osborne (2009a), Aiyar, Calomiris,
and Wieladek (2014) and Bridges, Gregory, Nielsen, Pezzini, Radia, and Spaltro (2014). However these papers and
ours contain differences in sample period, coverage, and/or the treatment of mergers. Therefore for completeness
we present our own results here.
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Table 1. Bank-level estimates of the relationships between minimum capital requirements, lending and
capital.
Dependent variable
Regressor Secured lending PNFC lending Capital ratio Trigger ratio
Secured lending 0.534 (8.51) – 0.160 (1.17) 0.025 (2.43) 0.000 (0.15)
PNFC lending – 0.040 (2.81) 0.218 (2.59) – 0.002 (1.41) 0.000 (0.18)
Capital ratio 0.120 (2.74) 0.300 (0.74) 0.794 (17.65) 0.026 (2.99)
Trigger ratio – 0.037 (0.20) – 2.18 (2.23) 0.234 (2.56) 0.897 (34.88)
Bank-level controls yes yes yes yes
Time fixed effects yes yes yes yes
R2 (within) 0.484 0.282 0.904 0.920
N × T 644 644 644 644
Note: Table shows within-group estimates for regressions of each of the dependent variables given in the column
headings on two lags of each of the regressors given in rows (equation (C.1)). Sums of coefficients on lags shown.
Absolute value of robust t–statistic in parentheses. Bank-level controls: Ratio of risk-weighted to total assets; ratio
of tier 1 to total (tier 1 plus tier 2) capital; provision ratio; loan:deposit ratio; size (total assets). Sample: N = 21 (see
Table A.2), 1989:4–2008:3. Further details may be found in Appendix C.
encompasses a single business cycle recovery, and a single downturn, which makes statistical
detection of a ‘medium-term’ financial cycle, lasting on average around 16 years problematic
(Drehmann, Borio, and Tsatsaronis, 2012). Failing to capture medium-term relationships be-
tween output and credit over-weights an unusual period in the early 1990s that combined a
strong economic recovery with weak bank mortgage lending associated with a major housing
bust (on which, see Muellbauer and Murphy, 1997). We therefore set elements of B correspond-
ing to interactions between macroeconomic and bank lending variables to point estimates from
an auxiliary reduced-form VAR run on 1975:Q1-1989:Q4 data.21
4.4 Identifying restrictions
As it stands, the model in (1) embodies no restrictions, aside from the requirement that
the A matrix be of full rank, and so is not identified. The schematic in Table 2 details how the
identifying restrictions discussed in section 3 map into the VAR, partitioning yt into four distinct
blocks of variables: macroeconomic (‘M’); bank lending (‘B’); the aggregate bank capital ratio
(‘K’); and the trigger ratio (policy variable, ‘P’). The restriction that macroeconomic variables
21The main impediment to extending the historical data before 1990 is the measurement of regulatory capital
itself: regulatory treatment of capital, and reported capital ratios, were not on the same basis as afterward. The
Basel Committee’s framework for capital measurement, which cemented the role of risk weighting assets in capital
adequacy assessments, was developed in the mid-1980s, and a bilateral US-UK capital adequacy agreement was
concluded in 1987 (see Tarullo, 2008). The Bank of England detailed its proposed rules for implementation of Basel
I in October, 1988. The Accord was fully introduced to UK law in 1990.
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Table 2. Unrestricted and restricted VAR coefficients
Impact matrix A
Variables M B P K
M × × ×
B × ×
P × ×
K ×
Lag matrix F`
Variables M B P K
M × × ×
B × × × ×
P × × ×
K × × ×
Note: Equations in columns, variables in rows. An × indicates position of non-zero
coefficient blocks in the A and F`, ` = 1, . . . , p matrices in equation (1). A blank entry
indicates a zero restriction. M – macroeconomic variables; B – bank lending variables;
K – system-wide capital ratio; P – trigger ratio (prudential policy variable).
affect capital regulation via their impact on lending and capital alone, and with a lag consistent
with reporting delays on banking variables, is captured by the exclusions on A and F` in
the microprudential policy equation (the column headed ‘P’). Second, the restriction that no
macroeconomic variable is able to respond directly to the policy variable, either within the
quarter or with a delay, means the trigger ratio is excluded from the macroeconomic block (the
column headed ‘M’) of the VAR (see also Peek, Rosengren, and Tootell, 2003). By contrast,
capital ratios respond immediately to changes in the trigger ratio, and loan quantities and
proxies for the cost of credit respond with a lag, consistent with there being some delays in
arranging new loans, and some stickiness in loan prices, as with the balance sheet dynamics
reported for U.S. banks by Hancock, Laing, and Wilcox (1995).22
5 The macroeconomic impact of microprudential regulation
5.1 Dynamics following a regulatory shock
The principal findings of this paper relate to the macroeconomic effects of changes in mi-
croprudential capital requirements. The main experiment that we consider is an unanticipated
increase in the trigger ratio, the minimum capital to risk-weighted asset ratio required by bank
regulators. The shock is normalized to 50 basis points, somewhat larger than the average
change to requirements in the data, but a plausible benchmark for the size of change that could
be contemplated in future (see section 6). Figure 2 shows the responses of banking system
variables, along with pointwise 68% error bands. Their responses under the prior are indicated
by ‘+’ symbols. The initial impact of the shock falls on the aggregate capital ratio. There is
an immediate increase in this ratio of around 10 basis points, and it then continues to increase
over a period of approximately 18 months. Surplus capital, having initially fallen, is therefore
22Based on the estimated Bayes factor for the restricted and unrestricted models the data overwhelmingly support,
by a factor of 150, the over-identifying restrictions imposed on the VAR.
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Figure 2. Banking system response to an unanticipated increase in aggregate
capital requirements. Note: The panels depict the impulse response functions of
aggregate lending and capital variables to an orthogonalized shock to the trigger
ratio of 50 basis points. −Median response. The shaded area represents pointwise
16 to 84 percentile error bands. + Bank-level prior responses. −− VAR responses,
with feedbacks closed down. The responses of household and corporate lending
are cumulated growth rates.
rebuilt fairly rapidly, and has returned to its baseline value within two years.
The effect of capital movements on the cumulated stock of bank lending is rapid and signif-
icant. Secured household lending is close to 0.5% lower, relative to trend, at around 18 months,
and non-financial corporate lending is around 1.5% lower. The estimated responses we observe
are consistent with equity capital being costly for banks to raise, leading regulatory capital
requirements to be a binding constraint on aggregate bank lending.23 The rate of decline in loan
growth levels off roughly coincident with the return of the aggregate buffer to its pre-shock
level, consistent with the findings in Me´sonnier and Stevanovic (2015). Because household
secured and corporate categories attract high risk weights—50% and 100% respectively under
23Binding in the sense of influencing banks’ lending behaviour. As noted above, banks maintain a buffer of capital
above regulatory minima to avoid accidental breaches of ‘hard floor’ requirements. The existence of the buffer does
not imply regulatory constraint is ‘slack’.
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Basel I—lower loan volumes entail a higher risk-based capital ratio, other things equal.24
Figure 2 further allows us to examine the responses from our VAR alongside those under
the prior estimated from bank-level data. The comparison shows that the decline in mortgage
lending is almost a full percentage point greater in the VAR case, while that for corporate
lending is slightly smaller. The source of these differences can be understood by closing down
the feedbacks that are present in the VAR, to make it behave like a bank-level model (dash lines):
in this case the two sets of responses are closely aligned.25 The macroeconomic response to the
regulation-induced decline in lending plays back onto banking system itself, amplifying and
propagating the initial impulse. As we will go on to demonstrate, it is this two-way interaction
between the banking block and the macroeconomy that is key to understanding the effects of
prudential policy on the economy at large.
Figure 3 summarises the responses of variables in the macroeconomic block.26 Aggregate
real expenditure declines in response to tighter bank credit conditions, consistent with the
existence of credit constrained and bank-dependent agents—a fundamental tenet of financial
accelerator theories (see Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1999). Changes in bank lending and in
real expenditure propagate to broader financial conditions. Corporate spreads widen as bank
credit supply contracts, which is consistent both with banks choosing to reduce high risk-weight
assets by selling off corporate bonds, and with substitution by marginal bank borrowers into
capital market funding. Consistent with a strong credit supply effect on the housing market,
house prices decline by 1% relative to baseline, and arrears increase by approximately 0.05
percentage points (not shown). Mortgage spreads are initially flat, but after four quarters stay
persistently above their pre-shock values. Consumer prices are marginally higher over the
first two years, consistent with a cost channel operating through loan spreads, whereafter they
undergo a noticeable decline, bringing about a systematic easing in monetary policy.
These patterns are in line with the responses of the U.S. economy to a bank credit supply
shock reported in Bassett, Chosak, Driscoll, and Zakrajsˇek (2014). There, a shock that produces
a 4% decline in lending capacity (loans outstanding and unused commitments) raises corporate
bond spreads by 40 basis points, and causes a fall of up to 0.7% in real GDP, with offsetting
movements in monetary policy. Qualitatively, these movements closely resemble the regulation-
induced supply shift we identify (although we lack data on loan commitments). On a long
24A drawback of the linear VAR approach is that it cannot accommodate the possibility that the cost of raising
equity may with the state of the business cycle, implying that the effects of trigger shocks are state-dependent.
Rather, it delivers an average response to such shocks. For an investigation into the dependence of bank-level
responses upon the level of aggregate credit growth, see Bahaj, Bridges, Malherbe, and O’Neill (2016).
25The prior and posterior distributions of the parameters in the bank lending block of the VAR are displayed in
Figures E.1–E.4 of Appendix E.
26Appendix D displays estimated impulse response functions when the policy and capital variables enter the
lending equations in first differences, rather than in levels.
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Figure 3. Macroeconomic response to an unanticipated increase in aggregate capital require-
ments. Note: The panels depict the impulse response functions of selected variables to an
orthogonalized shock to the trigger ratio of 50 basis points. – Median response. The shaded
area represents pointwise 16 to 84 percentile error bands.
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sample of UK data, Barnett and Thomas (2014) likewise estimate that a credit supply shock
that reduces lending growth by 1% raises corporate bond spreads by a similar amount, and
lowers GDP growth by up to 0.1%. Their findings indicate a slightly weaker pass-through from
bank credit to aggregate expenditure than estimated here (but they report larger effects on a
post-1992 sub-sample).
Variance decompositions show that the majority of the variation in the trigger ratio at hori-
zons up to a year is the result of regulatory shocks. At the two-year horizon, they account
for about 16% of the variation in the capital ratio, and 2% of the variation in mortgage lend-
ing growth. But as large regulatory shocks were observed only infrequently, on average their
contribution to fluctuations in the macroeconomy was—reassuringly—very small. Historical
decompositions, which trace the cumulative impact of structural shocks at each date, indicate
that regulatory shocks made modest contributions to movements in aggregate variables, partic-
ularly in the mid-1990s. Figure 4 shows that in the absence of changes in capital requirements,
mortgage spreads would have been some 15 basis points lower and corporate bond spreads
around 5 basis points lower than was the case. Mortgage lending growth was reduced by 0.1
annual percentage points, and corporate lending growth by some 0.3 percentage points. These
effects fed through to house prices, which were lower by up to 1% as a result (not shown). The
largest impact fell on the banking system capital ratio: it was 80 basis points higher in 1998 than
in the absence of shocks, and 40 basis points lower in 2008.
In summary, we find that changes in regulatory capital requirements have real effects,
consistent with the developing literature on the macroeconomic impact of financial shocks.
Regulation was not, on average, an important source of aggregate fluctuations, but large regu-
latory shocks caused movements in mortgage and corporate bond spreads, house prices, and
in particular the banking system capital ratio.
5.2 Feedbacks and financial accelerator effects
To better understand the transmission channels at play, in this section we unpick the full
system responses described above using posterior simulations in which various endogenous
variables are held constant at their baseline values by selectively setting coefficients to zero,
as in Sims and Zha (1996).27 Figure 5 indicates how the system responds in the absence of
the financial accelerator mechanism, that is, holding mortgage and corporate bond spreads
constant. For comparison, the baseline responses from Figures 2 and 3 are shown as dash
lines. In this case we see that the decline in aggregate expenditure is about half as large as
in the baseline case where spreads rise: Higher credit spreads act to amplify the regulatory
27These experiments are not intended to assess the plausibility of the implied restrictions, or to pose a counter-
factual change in the structure of the economy (for which, see section 6). Rather, they are intended to highlight the
role played by the dynamic responses of particular variables.
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Figure 4. Historical contribution of regulatory shocks to path of selected variables.
Note: The panels depict the difference between the actual path of each variable, and
the path that would have been followed if regulatory shocks had be zero. – Median
path. The shaded area represents pointwise 16 to 84 percentile error bands.
18
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
Real GDP
p
e
rc
e
n
t
5 10 15 20
−0.2
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
House prices
p
e
rc
e
n
t
5 10 15 20
−1
−0.5
0
Corporate lending
p
e
rc
e
n
t
5 10 15 20
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
Mortgage lending
p
e
rc
e
n
t
5 10 15 20
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
Trigger ratio
b
a
si
s
p
o
in
ts
Quarters since shock
5 10 15 20
0
20
40
60
Capital ratio
b
a
si
s
p
o
in
ts
Quarters since shock
5 10 15 20
0
20
40
60
Figure 5. Responses to an unanticipated increase in aggregate capital requirements holding
credit spreads constant. Note: The panels depict the impulse response functions of selected
variables to an orthogonalized shock to the trigger ratio of 50 basis points, with mortgage and
corporate bond spreads held constant. – Median response. - - Unrestricted impulse-response
function (see Figures 2 and 3). The shaded area represents pointwise 16 to 84 percentile error
bands.
19
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
Real GDP
p
e
rc
e
n
t
5 10 15 20
−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
House prices
p
e
rc
e
n
t
5 10 15 20
−2.5
−2
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
Mortgage lending
p
e
rc
e
n
t
5 10 15 20
−2
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
Corporate lending
p
e
rc
e
n
t
5 10 15 20
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
Corporate bond spread
b
a
si
s
p
o
in
ts
Quarters since shock
5 10 15 20
−2
0
2
4
6
8
Mortgage spread
b
a
si
s
p
o
in
ts
Quarters since shock
5 10 15 20
0
5
10
15
20
25
Figure 6. Responses to an unanticipated increase in aggregate capital requirements holding
policy interest rates fixed. Note: The panels depict the impulse response functions of selected
variables to an orthogonalized shock to the trigger ratio of 50 basis points, with the short
term nominal interest rate held fixed. – Median response. - - Unrestricted impulse-response
function (see Figures 2 and 3). The shaded area represents pointwise 16 to 84 percentile error
bands.
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disturbance, as in the classic financial accelerator mechanism. Both firm-side and household-
side financial accelerator effects appear to be important, as emphasised in Iacoviello (2005) for
example.
It is noteworthy that Figure 5 shows bank lending and bank capital variables responding
similarly to the baseline case, indicating that feedbacks from spreads to the banking system are
relatively weak. Feedbacks appear to be most important within the banking system itself. For
example, if corporate lending is held constant, the responses of secured lending, spreads, house
prices and real expenditure are all muted; if mortgage lending is held constant, the transmission
to the real economy is close to nil, indicating the central role played by housing (see in particular
Iacoviello and Minetti, 2008; Walentin, 2014).
Our second scenario involves holding the policy interest rate constant. The prolonged
period that advanced economies, including the UK, have spent at the zero nominal interest rate
bound since 2009 naturally raises the question of how tighter regulation might play out when
monetary policy is constrained. Figure 6 shows that the constraint on monetary policy leads to
amplified responses to tighter prudential policy. The main effects fall on the housing market.
House prices decline by around 2% four years out versus 1%, and arrears (not shown) also rise
strongly. Around 5bps are added to mortgage spreads, likely the result of the higher credit
risk associated with rising arrears, and the impact on mortgage lending is modestly negative.
From a stabilisation perspective, the most significant finding is that the decline in aggregate
expenditure in response to tighter prudential policy is both larger—at about 0.3%, compared to
the baseline of 0.2%—and more protracted when monetary policy rates are constant.
6 A macroprudential counterfactual
It is now widely recognized that pre-2008 bank regulation was excessively focused on indi-
vidual institutions, and failed to act on build-ups of system-wide risk. The macroprudential
approach to regulation explicitly takes into account trends in the financial sector that pose
such risks, in particular rapid growth in aggregate bank credit (for an overview, see Hanson,
Kashyap, and Stein, 2011). Basel III introduces a new regulatory tool, the counter cyclical buffer
(CCyB), to address these macroprudential concerns. The CCyB, which applies to all banks,
is a variable requirement on the common equity ratio. It is one of the macroprudential tools
given to national regulatory authorities in recent EU-wide legislation, known as Capital Reg-
ulation Directive or CRD IV, to be phased in from 2016 in Europe. An important question for
policymakers is the extent to which changes to the required countercyclical buffer will lead to
changes first in banking system capital ratios, and second in aggregate credit growth and wider
economic conditions. Answering these questions is hard because there have so far been only
limited applications of the CCyB, but also interesting because the CCyB is not prone to some of
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the leakages associated with other prudential tools.28 The previous sections have shown how
variation in microprudential capital requirements led to variation in banking system capital ra-
tios that exerted some influence on the macroeconomy, and so it is tempting to try to extrapolate
from the old regime in the hope of learning something about the new one.
In order to provide some indicative evidence on the effect of a countercyclical macropruden-
tial capital requirement, the remainder of this section reports on the results of a counterfactual
simulation exercise employing the model developed above. The basic idea is straightforward.
We use the VAR to recover the time series of structural shocks that hit the economy over the
sample period. Then taking the proposed macroprudential policy instrument to be the trigger
ratio, we modify the corresponding equation in the VAR to introduce some counterfactual feed-
back from financial conditions (to be specified) to system wide bank capital requirements. We
then ask how the paths followed by the endogenous variables of the system change when the
model is simulated using the same exogenous structural shocks as the driving force, but with
the counterfactual equation setting the aggregate required capital ratio.29
The principal objection to the counterfactual analysis just described is that it falls foul of the
Lucas (1976) critique, as it takes the remaining structural relations in the VAR to be invariant
to the introduction of the macroprudential policy. If private agents do take changes to bank
regulation into account when forming expectations of future policy, the results may be in error.
However, there are reasons to proceed, albeit with some care. In the specific context of risk-based
capital regulation, which was itself a novel policy tool in 1990, it is not clear that agents would
have been capable of formulating an estimate of what the ‘usual’ policy response would be;
deviations from the estimated rule, particularly over the early part of the sample, are so unlikely
to cause Lucas-type concerns. Moreover, as will be made clear below, the simulated impact of
macroprudential policy on macroeconomic variables is for the most part rather modest.
In weighing the merits of this exercise, it is important to recognize that the treatment of
banking in DSGE models remains quite stylized, and that a consensus view on the specification
of a fully structural model for macroprudential analysis is not currently in evidence in the
profession. The discussion below provides a qualitative comparison between one candidate
model, due to Angelini, Neri, and Panetta (2014), and our own, which indicates that the two
approaches lead to similar conclusions.
28For example, raising sectoral capital requirements sectoral risk weights may drive lending activity out of one
sector and into another; and higher Pillar 2 requirements at one regulated institution may drive lending activity to
another. The issue of leakages to foreign branches (Aiyar, Calomiris, and Wieladek, 2014) and to non-bank lenders
remain common to prudential policy measures in general, however.
29We do not know the precise form policy on countercyclical macroprudential capital buffers will take in practice,
but for the purposes of this exercise we rule out threshold effects, non-linearities, and reaction to indicators other
than those included in the model as it stands (e.g. the results of banking system stress tests such as the Federal
Reserve’s SCAP). In other words, we limit the scope of the counterfactual macroprudential policies we consider to
those taking the form of a linear feedback rule on macroeconomic and financial variables.
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Figure 7. Simulated paths for macroeconomic and banking variables under a
counterfactual macroprudential rule responding to house price acceleration. Note:
Solid black line – median path under counterfactual rule; solid pink line – data.
The shaded area represents pointwise 16 to 84 percentile error bands.
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6.1 Feedback on housing
The counterfactual policy we construct is based on housing finance, which is a particular
focus for macroprudential policymakers in the UK due to the size of banks’ exposures to the
mortgage market. It is parameterized so that the trigger is raised when house prices are
accelerating, and when spreads are falling:
trigt = θ
hp∆2 ln housept − θspr
(
sprt −
1
2
[
sprt−1 + sprt−2
])
+ θˆ
′
wt + ν
trig
t (3)
where θˆ
′
wt is the estimated feedback on banking variables in the policy rule. In the simula-
tion, θhp is set to 3/4 and θspr is set to 1/5, which ensures that the range of variation in the
counterfactual capital requirement is broadly in line with the 2.5% limit laid down in Basel III.30
The effects of the simulated macroprudential policy are shown in Figure 7. The most
noticeable impact falls upon on the policy instrument itself, and on capital ratios: the trigger
ratio is lower throughout the 1990s, as policy attempts to ease conditions in the mortgage
market. The trigger ratio would have been around 50 basis points lower than the historical
ratio during this period. Simulated capital ratios would also have been somewhat lower as a
result. The remaining simulated paths are not, in most cases, radically different from those that
were actually observed.
There are indications that this alternative policy rule would have contributed towards
stabilizing the housing market. Under the simulation, mortgage lending is higher through the
mid-1990s, and mortgage spreads are 20 basis points or so lower. House prices (not shown)
are marginally higher in this period. The picture alters as we move into the 2000s. Now the
counterfactual capital requirement is higher than the observed one, as are capital ratios. This
would have tended to depress mortgage lending growth, so that by the mid-2000s the stock
of mortgage loans would have converged towards, and eventually dipped below, the level
actually observed. Spreads would also have been higher under the counterfactual policy, and
house prices lower, over this latter period.
Throughout the simulation, there is barely any impact on growth in GDP (not shown). A key
reason for this is the endogenous response of monetary policy. As can be seen from the figure,
the counterfactual monetary policy would have been marginally tighter through the period in
the 1990s when the counterfactual macroprudential policy was easier; and it would have been
marginally looser through the mid-2000s, when macroprudential policy was tighter.31 It is
30Variation in the buffer beyond this limit are possible, but need not be reciprocated in other jurisdictions.
31The apparent coordination between monetary and macroprudential policies arises because the latter has an
effect on the macroeconomic variables to which monetary policy primarily responds. But a formal analysis of policy
coordination, such as that in Angelini, Neri, and Panetta (2014) for example, is beyond the scope of this analysis.
As a practical matter, it is noteworthy that Angelini, Neri, and Panetta report paths for capital requirements, capital
ratios, and lending that are virtually identical whether coordination is present or not.
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noteworthy that the model predicts no contradiction in this particular mix of policies, a caveat
being that it does not account for a possible ‘risk-taking’ channel of monetary policy (Borio
and Zhu, 2012). In these simulations, offsetting monetary policy action is able to stimulate the
broad economy at the same time that macroprudential policy damps down mortgage lending
and raises bank capital ratios.
6.2 Alternative rules
As a robustness check, we examined how a policy feeding back on the aggregate private
sector credit-to-GDP gap set out by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010b) would
have performed.32 The counterparts to higher capital ratios would have been consistently lower
mortgage and corporate lending, and higher mortgage spreads. These patterns are consistent
with capital requirements having a relatively large effect on lending, and a relatively modest
effect on GDP. The simulation reveals an apparent drawback with the credit gap indicator: By
raising capital requirements during the deleveraging phase of the credit cycle, when the credit
gap was still high but lending growth was falling, the counterfactual rule acts to amplify the
decline in credit. The effect was particularly pronounced for corporate lending, which effectively
suffers ‘collateral damage’ from mortgage market deleveraging.33 Exactly this concern was
raised by Repullo and Saurina (2012) on the basis of simple correlation analysis for a sample of
developed economies.
6.3 Discussion
It is instructive to compare our counterfactual exercise with that from the estimated DSGE
model in Angelini, Neri, and Panetta (2014), which does not fall foul of Lucas critique concerns.
Their results indicate that, in response to a business cycle shock, output and inflation follow
near-identical paths whether or not a CCyB instrument is active. The main impact of the
macroprudential instrument is on lending spreads, loan volumes, and the capital ratio itself.
In this respect, the DSGE counterfactual leads to rather similar conclusions to those from the
VAR approach. An interesting point of difference is that those authors also report a somewhat
less active monetary policy response to shocks, whereas in our exercise the monetary policy
rule is assumed unchanged; but the predictions from the VAR and DSGE approaches are not
obviously at variance.
There remain of course reasons to doubt that counter cyclical macroprudential policy will
have precisely the effects outlined above. A relevant difference between the microprudential
32The credit gap is the difference between the ratio of a broad measure of credit to GDP, and a one-sided HP
filtered estimate of its trend. The baseline model is re-estimated to include this variable within the macro block.
33Although not considered here, a better macroprudential instrument to deploy at this time might have been a
sectoral capital requirement targeted on mortgage lending.
25
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
and macroprudential regimes is that the Basel CCyB does not form a ‘hard floor’ for banks’
capital ratios. Breaches of the combined required capital ratio will lead to restrictions on payouts
to equity holders, rather than regulatory action. However, there is evidence that banks are very
reluctant to reduce payouts even in the face of substantial losses (Acharya, Gujral, Kulkarni,
and Shin, 2011). Recent studies support the idea that such reluctance is due to an underlying
risk-shifting motive (Onali, 2014). It therefore seems probable that banks will avoid breaching
their combined capital requirement under the CCyB regime.
Overall, the simulated effects of macroprudential policy on the macroeconomy are small,
while their effects on banking lending and loan spreads are modest. The main payback to
macroprudential policy appears to lie in the higher capital ratios that banks maintain at the end
of the simulation, compared to those that were observed.
7 Robustness
This section reports on two sets of sensitivity analyses. In the first, we present the results of
using a variant of our baseline prior in which the weight placed on bank-level information
in estimation is reduced. Our presumption thus far has been that the additional information
present for variables in the banking block should dictate that it has a relatively higher weight,
compared to the aggregate banking data. A ‘looser’ prior results in posterior estimates that put
more weight on the 1990-2008 aggregate data, and less weight on micro data.34 The response of
real GDP to a trigger ratio shock under the looser prior is shown in Figure 8(a) (solid line). The
baseline response is also shown (dash line). The median decline in GDP is somewhat larger
than in the baseline case. Underlying this is an on average larger, but much more uncertain,
response of lending to changes in the trigger ratio. However, the baseline output response lies
within the wider error bands generated in the loose prior case. We therefore conclude that
from the perspective of the looser prior, the baseline responses remain plausible, and that some
shrinkage towards bank-level estimates is helpful in sharpening estimates of the link between
capital and lending.
The second sensitivity check we perform relates to the identification of the policy equa-
tion. We re-estimate the VAR using a standard contemporaneously recursive scheme, with the
trigger ratio ordered second-to-last (see Table 3). Under this scheme, policy can respond to
macroeconomic variables contemporaneously and at lags. The estimated response of policy
and the associated lending responses are similar to the baseline, and as a result the shape and
magnitude of the real GDP response remains very close to the base case as well (dash line), as
34The exercise involves varying the hyperparameter controlling the prior tightness on the banking block of the
model (the parameter λ j2 in Appendix B), while holding constant the coefficients in the policy equation such that the
trigger ratio in Figure 8(a) behaves as in Figure 2. In this way, we avoid confounding differences in the policy path
with differences in the impact of policy on lending.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 8. Panel (a): The effect on the response of real GDP to
an unanticipated increase in aggregate capital requirements of
putting lower weight on bank-level information (–).
Panel (b): The effect on the response of real GDP to an unan-
ticipated increase in aggregate capital requirements of allowing
policy to feed back on macroeconomic variables (–).
Note: – – Median real GDP response in the baseline model. Shaded
areas represent pointwise 16 to 84 percentile error bands.
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Table 3. An alternative identification scheme
Identification I: Policy responds to all macroeconomic variables
Impact matrix A
Variables M B P K
M × × × ×
B × × ×
P × ×
K ×
Lag matrix F`
Variables M B P K
M × × × ×
B × × × ×
P × × ×
K × × ×
Note: An × indicates position of non-zero coefficient blocks in the A and F`, ` = 1, . . . , p
matrices in equation (1). M – macroeconomic variables; B – bank lending variables; K –
system-wide capital ratio; P – prudential policy variable (trigger ratio).
Figure 8(b) (solid line) indicates. The result offers good additional evidence in favour of the
argument in Section 4.4, in that the macroeconomy appears to have had a minor direct effect
on prudential policy (although its indirect effect, via banking variables, is more significant). In
sum, our results appear reassuringly robust to variations in our set of baseline assumptions.
8 Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated that variation in microprudential capital requirements at individ-
ual banks, when aggregated, caused changes in aggregate credit supply, aggregate expenditure,
and asset prices under the Basel I and II regimes in the UK. An increase in the required capital
ratio is estimated to have had persistent and negative effects on overall household and corporate
lending growth, consistent with the existence of binding regulatory constraints on banks at the
system level. Lower credit growth was found to exert downward pressure on GDP, with wider
corporate bond and mortgage spreads acting to amplify the initial impulse through a financial
accelerator channel. These results add to the growing literature on the real effects of financial
disturbances.
The paper also offered a counterfactual analysis of the type of macroprudential capital
tool introduced under Basel III. Simulations of the structural VAR model developed in the
paper indicated that a macroprudential rule that mechanically tracked the credit-to-GDP gap,
an indicator proposed by the Basel Committee, would have produced greater fluctuations in
credit than a rule that reacted to house price acceleration and mortgage spreads. The analysis
we presented complements a burgeoning literature that uses DSGE models to simulate the
effects of macroprudential policy. Indeed, our results appear encouragingly consistent with the
findings of at least one such study (Angelini, Neri, and Panetta, 2014).
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